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TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF OCEAN
SPACE DISPUTES: A WORKING PAPER

I. INTRODUCTION
In June, 1974, the Third Law of the Sea Conference will convene
in Caracas, Venezuela to consider the establishment of an Ocean Regime. Although the ostensible scope of this conference is limited
to a regime for the seabed and the subsoil of the ocean floor, a
glance at the ancillary matters to be considered reveals that machinery could be established with jurisdiction over all matters related to ocean space (i.e. the water surface, water column, the
ocean floor, and the subsoil).1 Irrespective of the scope of matters encompassed by the proposed regime, a necessary component
of that machinery is a means of effecting the compulsory peaceful
settlement of disputes. The question of whether in fact there
should even be a regime of any type is beyond the scope of this inquiry. Numerous commentators, as well as the United Nations,
have considered an ocean regime to be both necessary and desirable.2 The number of proposed drafts for a regime from nations
1. Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the Sea-Bed and

the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Underlying the High Seas Be-

yond the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction and Use of Their Resources in the Interests of Mankind, and Convening of a Conference on

the Law of the Sea. ,G.A. Res. 2750 (XXV) U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970),
10 INfTL LEGAL IVMATEiL& 224, 228 (1971).

2. Id. See also E.B. Jomis, LAW ov THE SFA (1972); Co1VnmssIOiN
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of all degrees of power and philosophy indicates that the real
question is not "whether," but "how"-what form should the regime take?
The manner in which the regime should provide for the pacific
settlement of disputes regarding matters within its competence is
the focus of this paper. The drafts advanced by parties interested
in an ocean or seabed regime provide, in varying forms, mere
structures. Few, if any, advance reasons for the particular device
chosen. The need is for criteria by which to evaluate these proposals. This article, then, will consist of:
1. The establishment of the criteria for a viable means of dispute
settlement.
2. A survey of all the settlement mechanisms available to the
international community.
3. Evaluation of the major regime proposals in light of the above.
H. THE CRITERIA
A.

Items Related to Jurisdiction

1. Compulsory Jurisdiction
Mandatory jurisdiction of the tribunal is a key element in securing compliance with the provisions of an ocean regime. 3 By bringMARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND REsouRcEs, OuR NATION AND THE SEA:

A PLAN FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1969); CENTER FOR THE STUDY Or DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, THE OCEAN REGVME (Center Occasional Paper VoL 1

no. 5, 1969); Eichelberger, The United Nations and the Bed of the Sea,
6 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 339 (1969); Pardo, An International Regime for the
Deep Seabed: Developing Law or Developing Anarchy?, 5 IiT'L L.F. 204
(1970).
This conclusion is, of course, not unanimous. See Ely, United States
Seabed Minerals Policy, 4 NAT. REs. LAW. 597 (1971), wherein Mr. North-

cutt Ely considered the American policy "exactly 180 degrees off course."
(at 609). He proclaimed the mineral resources of the American continental
shelf "exclusively the heritage of the American people." (at 609). In sum,
Ely seems to favor the extension of sovereignty to the 200 meter isobath,
and believes the proposed regime for the deep ocean floor to be unnecessary
and complex: "a floating Chinese pagoda, the S.S. Parkinson." (at 621).
At a lesser degree of vituperation, the National Petroleum Council (see
NATIONAL PETROLEUM CouNcIL, PETROLEUM REsouRcEs UNDER THE OCEAN
FLOOR, 69-78 [March 1968]) and the ABA (see American Bar Association
Resolution 73: Non-Living Resources of the Sea in 2 NAT. REs. LAw. 440-41

[1969]) agree with Mr. Ely. In light of the ability of current and foreseeable technology to exploit the ocean resources and the attending possibili-

ties for conflict, this viewpoint is at best, parochial. For an excellent survey of the dramatic advance in ocean technology, see Nauda, Some Legal

Questions on the Peaceful Uses of Ocean Space, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 343,
372-82.
3. Stevenson, U.S. Calls for Prompt International
Action To Settle
Problems of Law of the Sea, 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 382, 384 (1972).

Offi-
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ing in one forum all actions relating to ocean space, piecemeal
litigation is prevented. As a beneficial by-product, such jurisdiction supplies an incentive to settle by negotiation cases which
are relatively weak.4 Furthermore, the settlement so reached is
more likely to be consonant with established legal principles where
jurisdiction is compulsory than where it is consensual. 5
Carte blanche acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of an
ocean regime tribunal will be unlikely if doing so deprives a nation of other means of settlement. 6 Because negotiation offers an
opportunity for the parties to compromise their important interests, it is an attractive alternative to adjudication.7 Hence, to gain
political acceptance, it is necessary to preserve for the parties the
option of settlement according to non-judicial means of their own
choice, subject to compulsory submission to the tribunal in case
such attempt at settlement is fruitless, or if settlement is not
reached in a reasonable time.
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Classification
The tribunal shall have both appellate and original jurisdiction. Generally, all prior avenues of redress within the structure
of the regime should be exhausted before appeal. For example, a
dispute arising under a regulation or decision of an administrative
body should be first challenged before that agency. To enforce
this provision, the tribunal must refer to the appropriate forum
any suit wherein relief was not sought at the lower level. Only
when no such lower organ exists should original jurisdiction lie.
Matters Generally
The tribunal should be competent to decide all matters encompassed within the general scope of the regime. This necessarily
cial U.N. recognition of this necessity is reflected in the Optional Protocol
of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 450

U.N.T.S. 169 (1958).

See also Merrills, The Justiciability of International

Disputes, 47 CAN. B. REv. 241, 243-44 (1969)

4. Merrills, supranote 3, at 252 n.41.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 268.
7. Id. at 246.

[hereinafter cited as Merrflis].

implies the power to interpret the document which established the
regime and to determine the propriety of all regulations and actions taken by its agencies. To preserve judicial independence,
questions of the tribunal's jurisdiction in a particular case should
be decided by the court.
A key factor inhibiting the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction is the vagueness and uncertainty of the substantive law to be
applied.8 Recourse to third-party adjudication has had only limited success due to the reluctance of nation-states to give to a
tribunal power over the nation's perceived vital interests.9 It is
politically unreasonable to expect a nation to ratify a regime
which contains a body with mandatory jurisdiction unless the
status of the law is clear. The substantive law of the regime
would be formulated by its legislative and administrative organs.
By limiting the tribunal's authority to the body of law so created,
the law to be applied would no longer be so uncertain. Questions
of international law beyond the scope of the regime could be certified by the tribunal for determination by the International Court
of Justice (ICJ). Thus, to gain political acceptance for the regime
and for the notion of compulsory dispute settlement, the tribunal
should have general jurisdiction limited, however, to ocean law.
3. Personal Jurisdiction
The subject matter jurisdiction of the tribunal will be co-extensive with the scope of the regime. Therefore, the judicial body
must be able to bind any entity that is capable of engaging in operations on which the court's subject matter jurisdiction is based.
An overview of the types of possible disputes shows that they may
arise between states, private persons (individual and corporate),
international organizations (e.g. the United Nations or the World
Bank) and between the regime and any of the above. 10 Personal
jurisdiction over each of the above stated parties is essential.
To prevent intrusions on national sovereignty, in the event that
8. Gross, The International Court of Justice: Considerationof Requirements for Enhancing its Role in the International Legal Order, 65 AM. J.
INr'i. L. 253, 254 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Gross, Considerationof Requirements]; C. RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 228 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as RHYNE].
9. Merrills, supra note 3, at 259-60.
10. AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, SECOND
(July
INTERIM REPORT OF THE DEEP SEA IV NERAL REsouRcEs CoAnvIrrcrn=
1970) in S. ODA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE OCEAN DEVELOPMENT
259, 269 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ODA]; Sohn, Settlement of International Disputes Relating to the Sea-Bed in PACEm IN MARuBus 11, A CONSTITUTION FOR THE OCEANS § I. 1. (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sohn].
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all parties to a dispute are nationals of one state, the courts of
that state should retain sole jurisdiction over the matter. However,
to ensure uniformity of the interpretation and application of the
document establishing the regime, any question of its interpretation or of the validity of a regulation or action made pursuant
thereto should be certified to the tribunal for a binding advisory
opinion."1 Such an arrangement would protect legitimate regime
interests while ensuring that purely municipal law is decided in
national courts.
B. Membership
1. Adequate Representation of the Various Legal Cultures of the
12
World.
One of the primary criticisms of the International Court of Justice is its failure tQ provide a voice to all the world's major
legal cultures.' 3 Such inequitable representation is a major factor
in undermining confidence in the court.'
The result is that the
court is little used and resort is made to other forms of dispute
settlement, peaceful and otherwise.
In order to secure political acceptance of the regime tribunal,
some accommodation of the various legal cultures must be made.
The manner of doing so is by no means clear. One viewpoint is
that the selection of judges should be de-politicized by placing
greater emphasis on the personal and professional capability of
the individuals than on a requirement that all legal systems be
represented. 5 It is thus argued that in a less politically charged
atmosphere, reference of conflicts to the court would be more common since the parties would have increased faith in the objectiv11. Sohn, supra note 10, at 7.
12. The International Court of Justice, as the only major court of global
jurisdiction, serves us here as an imperfect guide in developing this criterion-imperfect because its jurisdiction is based on consent rather than
on compulsion. Nonetheless, an analysis of the reasons for the inability
of the ICJ to command compulsory jurisdiction is valuable in anticipating
and overcoming objections to vesting compulsory jurisdiction in the ocean
regime tribunal.
13.

A

Gross, Review of the Role of the International Court of Justice, 66

. J. INT'L L. 479, 485 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gross, Review of Role];

RHYm, supra note 8, at 228.

14. Gross, Considerationof Requirements, supra note 8, at 254.
15. Id. at 281-82.

ity and impartiality of the judges. On the other hand, it has been
suggested that every effort be made to assure representation of
"various legal cultures."16 In light of the tendency of nations to
align into economic, social, or political blocs, 17 it would appear wiser
to recognize reality than to pretend that nations would voluntarily
submerge their vital interests. By providing a tangible stake of
representation in the judicial process, the prospects for international acceptance of the ocean regime would be considerably enhanced.
2. Competence of Personnel
Persons selected to the tribunal should have generally recognized
competence and expertise in ocean law, and be well disposed toward
the goals and procedures of the regime.
C. Judgment and Enforcement
When it is recalled that the purpose of the tribunal is to provide
a forum for dispute settlement, it becomes clear that, in order to
achieve that objective, the court should be free to fashion the remedy to the particular case. That is, the court must have the power
to declare rules and acts of the regime to be void, to award damages, to order injunctions and other equitable relief, and to declare
the status of the parties. It has been suggested that the decision
may be made in the form of a recommendation, an advisory opinion, or a binding judgment.1 8 It is difficult to see the usefulness
of a non-binding recommendation since the parties could ignore
it with impunity.
Thus, in order that the dispute be permanently settled, the decision of the tribunal should be final and binding on the parties. 19
In addition, because the court is to be one of special competence
(i.e. ocean disputes), to promote uniformity in the law, no appeal
may be taken from any decision. 20 To mitigate the harshness of

16. Gross, Review of Role, supra note 13, at 485.
17. Gross, Considerationof Requirements, supranote 8, at 282.
18. Sohn, supra note 10, at 3.
19. RHYNE, supra note 8, at 295.
20. It is anticipated that objection will be made to this "one-shot" approach. However, original jurisdiction without appeal vested in the highest court of a governing body is not without precedent in international
law. Moreover, the alternatives are even more objectionable. Appeal to
the International Court of Justice is ill-advised for the reasons discussed
in Part III(F) infra. Recourse to the courts of the various nation-states
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the finality rule, provisions should be made to reopen the case
where material evidence which could not have been discovered
earlier by the exercise of due diligence, becomes available after
judgment.
Unless a judgment can be enforced, it is of little or no value.
To ensure the tribunal's independence and promote confidence in
2
the judicial process, the judgment should be self-executing. 1
Further, the court should have the power to make all writs to
effectuate its decision. Finally, there must be a scheme for providing compulsory recognition of the judgment in the courts of the
various nations. Beyond that, enforcement should be left to the
executive arm of the regime.
D. General Attributes
1. Expediency

Lawyers and laymen alike pay universal homage to the ancient
axiom "Justice delayed is justice denied." The complaint of judicial delay is as old as the Magna Carta. 22 The culprit is not delay
per se, but unreasonable delay caused by a clogged and cumbersome legal system. The judicial process is an intellectual one; it
demands time for comprehensive fact finding, development of legal issues, and thoughtful decision making.23 The passing of time
may promote negotiated settlement as the parties' claims become
24
less speculative and the probability of the outcome more certain.
The problem arises when, due to the inadequacies of the structure,
would so fragmentize and detail the authority of the tribunal as to make
it powerless.

21. To require the further act of another organ of a government to execute a court decision is tantamount to granting to that organ a veto over
the power of the court. For a discussion of the debilitating effect of this
malady on the International Court of Justice see Deutsch, A Plan for the
Reconstitution of the International Court of Justice, 49 A.B.A.J. 537, 543

(1963) [hereinafter cited as Deutsch].
22. 2 KLEIN AND LEE, Selected Writings of Arthur T. Vanderbilt in CURRENT ISSUES ON THE JUDICIARY 9, 14-16

(AMEcAN JUDICATURE Soc=-'n

1971).
23. CouRT CONGEsTIoN AND DELAY 2-3 (G. Winters ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as Winters].
24. Id.

the expectancies of the parties are frustrated. In that case, resort
25
to violent self-help may not be uncommon.
Thus, the proposed regime must provide a means of settling disputes with reasonable dispatch. This criterion has two components:
1. The rules of procedure must not build in delay by permitting excessive20 and unreasonable interlocutory appeals and
continuances.
2. The structure must be flexible so to provide27 sufficient
personnel and space to maintain a current caseload.
2. Economy
With the possible exception of discouraging spurious suits, little
is gained when the cost of bringing or defending a suit is unreasonably high. If, for example, the cost is too high, it is conceivable
that a large private corporation could overreach a smaller party
from a developing country merely by threatening suit. Recalling
that an ocean regime conceives of global operations, it is easy
to see that the cost of transporting litigants, witnesses, and counsel
to the tribunal, 28 court costs due to the overhead of the tribunal,
and loss due to delay 29 could be prohibitory. Obviously, then, the
proposed mechanism for settling disputes must:
1. provide for low cost appearance before the tribunal.
2. minimize overhead or at least not tax excessive costs. This
would imply that if costs to the tribunal exceed the costs
charged to the litigants, the ocean regime must have a source
of income to support the judicial body.
3. be reasonably expeditious.

III. SURVEY OF THE MTEANS OF DIsPUTE SETTLEMENT
Having established the attributes desired in a system for dispute settlement, the full range of procedures available to the international commtinity should now be considered. The purpose of
this survey is two-fold: To ensure that no viable method is overlooked, and to comment on the relative efficacy of each device in
light of the criteria developed in Part II of this article.30
25. Id. at 3-4.
26. Id. at 6-7, 13-14.
27. Id. at 4-5.
28. RHYNE, supra note 8, at 228.
29. Winters, supranote 23, at 4.
30. It should be recalled that this inquiry contemplates the establishment of an ultimate means of settlement. Hence, the evaluation of each
device is limited to a consideration of its suitability for that particular
purpose.
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A.

Inquiry

In the strictest sense, inquiry is not a means of settlement, but
an effort to establish a basis for settlement.31 This is generally
done by reference to a commission which has the sole function of
clarifying the facts so that the disputants may resolve their differences on their own.3 2 Inquiry has the obvious advantage of not
forcing a settlement on the parties. Whether leaving them free to
apply and interpret the law as they see fit is likewise advantageous depends on the importance given to uniformity in the law
by the regime.
On the negative side, inquiry imposes no duty to settle; the
facts may be determined, but there is no guarantee that the conflict
will be resolved. The failure of many U.N. fact-finding missions to
finally settle disputes is well known. 33 Thus, the inquiry's limited
scope and lack of finality makes it unacceptable for the purpose of
dispute settlement.
B.

Conciliation

Conciliation consists of referral of the case by the disputants
to a mutually agreed upon third party who is to make an independant assessment of the facts and to propose a settlement. 34 Generally, the conciliator has no authority apart from that granted to
him by the parties.3 5 The recommendation of the conciliator has
no binding force or legal effect.3 6
While conciliation may be desirable as a preliminary device, its
inability to issue binding determinations does not serve the cause
of compulsory settlement.
C. Good Offices
For the purpose of calling into existence negotiations between
the disputants, states, individuals, or international organizations
31. 12 M. WHITEmAI, DIGEST Or INTERNATIONAL LAW 946 (1971) [hereinafter cited as W=mT
].
32. Id. at 958; BnNE, supra note 8, at 289. It should be noted that
frequently inquiry will give rise to conciliation as the parties assign new
functions to what was originally a mere fact-finding commission.
33. WHrr i,
supra note 31, at 947.
34. Id. at 958; RHmNE, supra note 8, at 266.
35. RHaxE, supra note 8, at 290.
36. Id. at 266; WiTEMnAN, supra note 31, at 958.

offer their service and facilities under the term "good offices. ' 37
As an inducement to negotiate, the third party may give advice
or make proposals, but may not interfere with talks once started.38
Good offices may be offered by the third party or requested by the
disputants.
This device fails because it is not a means to compel settlement,
but a mere proposal to consider a solution. The criteria of compulsory settlement, then, renders good offices superfluous.
D.

Mediation

Mediation is the direct conduct by a third party of negotiations
on the basis of proposals made by the mediator. 39 Although the
mediator has political authority apart from that conferred on him
by the disputants, 40 his basic task is to seek a compromise of interests rather than to resolve the legal merits of the claims. 41 The advantages derived thereby are at least two-fold. Since the mediator
is independently and directly involved in the talks, he provides imput of ideas, interests, and proposals which perhaps might not
otherwise be considered by the parties. More importantly, he is
not restricted to legal issues; hence, he may be able to achieve a
fair accomodation of political and economic interests.
An objection to this latter aspect is that settlements based on
interests tend to fragmentize the law. This fear may be overcome
if the mediator is impressed with a duty to apply regime law to
the facts. There is, however, a more insurmountable quarrel with
42
the concept of mediation-the parties are in no way bound by it.
Because it cannot perform the basic function of effecting compulsory settlement, mediation is inappropriate to the needs of the regime.
E. Arbitration
"The basic difference between arbitration and judicial settlement is the composition of the two adjudicating bodies. ' 43 (emphasis original) In the broadest sense then, arbitration is the binding
determination of disputes by one or more umpires chosen by the
37. 2 L. OPPENmEm, INERNATiONAL LAw 10 (1906)
OPPENHEi1V]; RHYNE, supra note 8, at 267; WmTEmAN,

[hereinafter cited as
supra note 31, at 995.

38. OPPENHEim, supranote 37, at 11.
39. Id. at 1011; RHYNE, supra note 8, at 267.
40. RHYNE, supra note 8, at 290.
41. Id. at 267.
42. Id. at 267; OPPENHEIm, supra note 37, at 11.
43. Jully, Arbitration and Judicial Settlement-Recent Trends, 48 Am.
J. INT'L L. 380 n.1 (1954) [hereinafter cited as JuJly].
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parties.44 Frequently, an arbital tribunal is established on an ad
hoc basis, to settle a single dispute.4 5 However, as evidenced by
the existence of the Permanent Court of Arbitration," such tribunal need not be temporary.
The arbital process usually begins with the execution of a compromis, which is the basic agreement between the parties to submit
to arbitration. It usually contains a statement of the subject matter of the dispute, the method of selecting the arbitrators, and the
procedure to be followed. 47 Other provisions may include: stipulation of agreed upon facts, relief sought, choice of applicable law,
language to be used, place of meeting, and conferral on the arbitrators of the right to decide ex aequo et bono. 48 Pursuant to the
compromis, the parties then select the arbitrator (s). Decision making among the arbitrators is usually done in one of two ways. By
one method, the arbitrators chosen by the parties make recommendations to the umpire (the "neutral" member chosen by the arbitrators) who then decides alone. In the alternative, all members
of the panel participate equally with the decision of the umpire being final if the panel is otherwise unable to agree.49 The decision
thus rendered is final and terminates the dispute without appeal.5 0
Because arbitration and adjudication are the only processes capable of binding the parties, comparison between them is inevitable.
On the international level, the International Court of Justice is
evaluated with arbitration of several types-commercial, non-commercial, institutional and ad hoc. In considering the relative merits
of arbitration, then, it is necessary to particularize the subject matter and the degree of institutionality of a given arbital board.
One of the more recurrent claims is that arbitration is faster and
44. OPPENHEIm, supra note 37, at 15; RHYxE, supranote 8, at 266.
45. RHYNE, supra note 8, at 266.

46. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
opened for signature July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, T.S. 392, 1 T.I.A.S. 230,
236-43.
47. WHITEMAN, supra note 31, at 1048.

48. Id. at 1048-49.
49. Cohn, The Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of

Commerce, 14 IN''L & CoMB. L.Q. 132, 143 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Cohn].
50. See, e.g., Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, opened for signature July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, T.S. 392, 1 T.I.A.S.

230, 243.

more economical than the International Court.51 In one analysis
of 300 commercial cases handled under the Court of Arbitration of
the International Chamber of Commerce, the average cost of the
proceedings was one-half percent of the total amount at stake,
the time consumed was seven months, and enforcement was denied
in only two instances.5 2 In another survey, however, 13 major noncommercial ad hoc arbital awards were compared with 30 ICJ contentious cases and 12 ICJ advisory opinions. The average duration of the proceedings was graphic: 843 days were consumed by the
the arbital tribunals; 550 days in the ICJ contentious cases, and
203 days for the advisory opinions. 53 Delay in such arbital proceedings is attributed to the time needed to pick the arbitrators
and settle the rules of procedure.5 4 Moreover, it is noted that in
non-commercial cases, the arbitrators will most likely have outside interests which make a speedy decision impossible.55 Finally, it
is noted that the cost of litigation before the ICJ is less than that
of submission to arbitration because all expenses including salaries
of the arbitrators and staff are borne by the parties. 5 Thus, it
appears that while arbitration may be expeditious and economical
in a commercial context, an ad hoc tribunal to decide a non-commercial question (e.g. interpretation of a treaty or a boundary dispute) is less likely to share those attributes.
Undoubtedly the main advantage of arbitration is the ability of
the parties to choose the arbitrators. Lack of confidence in the impartiality of third party decision-making is the primary obstacle
to political acceptance of compulsory adjudication of disputes. 57
By placing control over the selection of the arbiter in the
hands of the disputants, it is asserted that such fears of bias will be
allayed. 8 Moreover, it is a means familiar to and understood by
most of the legal systems of the world. 59 On this score, then, arbitration could possibly generate much needed political support.
51. Eubanks, International Arbitration in the Political Sphere, 26 ARB.
J. (n.s.) 129-30 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Eubanks]; Norberg, Revitalization of Commercial Arbitration in the Western Hemisphere, 3 INT'L LAW.
109, 110 (1968); Cohn, supra note 49, at 132 n.1; RHYNE, supra note 8,
at 295.
52. Cohn, supra note 49, at 132 n.1.
53. Gross, The Time Element in the Contentious Proceedingsin the InternationalCourt of Justice, 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 74 83 (1969).
54. Jully, supra note 43, at 396-97.
55. Id. at 397.
56. Id. See also Gross, Review of Role, supra note 13, at 486.
57. Eubanks, supranote 51, at 135.
58. Id. See also Henry, A Plea for Compulsory Arbitration of International Disputes, 54 A.B.A.J. 1187, 1189 [hereinafter cited as Henry].
59. Eubanks, supra note 51, at 130; Henry, supra note 58, at 1189.
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In general, it appears that arbitration has had its greatest success
in the commercial world. The Resolutions of the Fourth International Congress on Arbitration"° deal exclusively with trade, scientific and technical development, and contract disputes. Indeed, this
method is well suited as a convenient, economical, and familiar
forum for private parties. However, in the public sphere, the mere
inclusion of an arbital clause in a treaty is no indication that arbitration will in fact be employed. 1 In short, the closer a dispute
interests, the less suscepticomes to involving important national
2
ble it is to settlement by arbitration.
F.

InternationalCourt of Justice

Although the ICJ is competent to hear only cases in which a
state is a party, 63 its subject matter jurisdiction embraces virtually
any international legal dispute.6 4 The court does not have compulsory jurisdiction unless a nation specifically grants it.65 In deciding a case, the judges may apply general principles of international
law, custom, or convention. Further, if the parties agree, the court
may decide a case ex aequo et bono.66 The court may award final
judgments, 67 defaults, 68 and non-binding advisory opinions,6 9 from
which there can be no appeal.70 Under the U.N. Charter, each
party is obliged to comply with the decision, subject to enforcement by the U.N. Security Council.7 1
The ICJ has been criticized as expensive, time-consuming, inaccessible, unrepresentative of the world's legal cultures, incapable
of enforcing a judgment, and unable to demand compulsory jurisdic60. Done at Moscow, Oct. 6, 1972 in 27 Aim. J. (n.s.) 225 (1972).
61. Jully, supra note 43, at 382.

62. Kennan, Arbitration and Conciliation in American Diplomacy, 26
ARB. J. (n.s.) 1, 6-7 (1971); see also Gross, Considerationof Requirements,

supra note 8, at 268-69.
63. I.C.J. STAT. art. 34, para. 1, 3 T.I.A.S. 1179, 1186.
64. I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, paras. 1-2, 3 T.I.A.S. 1179, 1186-87; RHYNE, supra
note 8, at 194.
65. I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, paras. 2-3, 3 T.I.A.S. 1186-87.
66. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38, 3 T.I.A.S. 1187.
67. I.C.J. STAT. art. 60, 3 T.I.A.S. 1191.
68. LC.J. STAT. art. 53, a T.I.A.S. 1190.
69. I.C.J. STAT. arts. 65-68, 3 T.LA.S. 1191-92.
70. LC.J. STAT. art. 60, 3 T.I.A.S. 1191.
71. U.N. CHARTER art. 94.

tion.7 2 Irrespective of the merits of these objections, the fact remains that the court does not have the confidence of the world
community.78 It would be a grave disservice to the future of an
ocean regime to plunge it into the controversy over the ICJ. Nonetheless, even if all the above contentions could be overcome, the
limitation of the court's jurisdiction to nation-states makes it unacceptable for regime purposes. The range of operations contemplated by the regime reveals that international organizations and
private persons, as well as states, will be parties to disputes. The
inability of the ICJ to provide a forum for all necessary parties
renders it inappropriate for the settlement of ocean space disputes.
IV.

EXAmINATION OF THE DEVICES FOR
IN

DIsPuTE

SETTLEMENT

THE MAJOR PROPOSALS FOR AN OCEAN
OR SEABED REGIME

Analysis of the major proposals for a seabed or ocean regime
discloses that the provisions for dispute settlement contained therein may be roughly grouped into three categories:
1. Referral to United Nations machinery (including the International Court of Justice)

A.

2.

Settlement by arbitration

3.

Creation of a court of maritime jurisdiction
Referral to United NationsMachinery

In varying forms, this recommendation is the position of the
Soviet Union,74 Tanzania, 75 the United Kingdom,7" many Latin
American states, 77 and the Commission to Study the Organization of
72. See RyxE, supra note 8, at 228; Gross, Consideration of Requirements, supra note 8, at 253-55; Deutsch, supra note 21, at 543.
73. Gross, Considerationof Requirements, supranote 8, at 253-54.
74. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Provisional Draft Articles of
a Treaty on the Use of the Sea-Bed for Peaceful Purposes, art. 22(2) (i),
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/43, 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 994, 1000 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Soviet Draft Articles]; ODA, supra note 10, at 124, 129.
75. The United Republic of Tanzania: Draft Statute for an International
Sea-Bed Authority, art. 39, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/33, 10 INTIL LEGAL MATERiLs 982, 992 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Tanzania Draft Statute]; ODA,
supra note 10, at 114, 123.
76. The United Kingdom: International Seabed Regime-Proposals for
Elements of a Convention, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/46 [hereinafter cited as
U.K. Seabed Proposals]; ODA, supra note 10, at 135.
77. Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela: Working Paper on the Regime for the Sea Bed and Ocean Floor
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Peace. 78 Briefly, Britain advocates either referral to the ICJ or
creation of an arbital tribunal. 79 Tanzania calls for submission to
the ICJ upon failure of negotiation, mediation, or arbitration, 0 as
does the Commission to Study.81 Russia would place on the regime's
executive arm the duty of applying Article 33 of the United Nations
Charter,8 2 a position which the several Latin American states adopt
83
by default.
Agreement upon the mere use of U.N. procedures would simply
preserve the status quo. Under current principles, U.N. Charter
Article 3384 already governs disputes occurring beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction.8 5 In certain instances, existing international
law provides greater assurance of compulsory peaceful settlement
and its Subsoil Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. ch. IV, U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 138/49, 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1003, 1010 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Latin American Working Paper]; ODA, supra note 10, at 142, 148.
78. Commission to Study the Organization of Peace: The United Nations and the Bed of the Sea-Draft Statute for a United Nations SeaBed Authority, art. 18 (June 1970) [hereinafter cited as Commission to
Study Draft Statute]; ODA, supra note 10, at 237, 239.
79. U.K. Seabed Proposals, supra note 76; §§ 24-25; ODA, supra note 10,
at 141.
80. Tanzania Draft Statute, supra note 75, art. 39, 10 I'L
LEGAL MA'EiALs 982, 992; ODA, supra note 10, at 123.
81. Commission to Study Draft Statute, supra note 78, art. 18; ODA, supra
note 10, at 243. The Commission proposal is the more restrictive; it mandates referral to the ICJ upon failure of negotiation alone, without providing for mediation or arbitration.
82. Soviet Draft Articles, supra note 74, art. 22(2) (i), 10 INT'L LEGAL
MATRIALS 994, 1000 (1971); ODA, supra note 10, at 129.
83. Latin American Working Paper, supra note 77, ch. IV, 10 INT'L LEGAL
MATEIALS 1003, 1010 (197,1); ODA, supra note 10, at 148. By making no
provisions under Chapter IV, parties to a dispute are obliged to settle according to Article 33 of the U.N. Charter. See discussion at note 84, infra.
84. The text of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter is:
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
- mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of
their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call
upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.
85. Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, § 15, G.A. Res. 2749

(XXV)

(1970),

10 INT'L LEGAL MATEIALS 220

(1971). Although the legal effect of this Declaration is uncertain, the duty
to comply with Article 33 of the U.N. Charter is obligatory on all U.N.
members by virtue of their membership.

than the above mentioned drafts. For example, disputes arising un87
der the U.N. Fisheries Convention80 are settled by arbitration.
Likewise, signatories of the Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes are obliged to either
arbitrate or submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ any
dispute regarding the interpretation of the Geneva Law of the Sea
Conventions of 1958.88 Even the regime proposals that call for referral to the International Court do not clearly state that such jurisdiction is compulsory. 9
Evaluation of propositions which employ present U.N. concepts and machinery consists of a balancing process between the efficacy of these measures and political acceptability of alternative
methods. Applying the criteria developed in Part H, it is clear that
the U.N. route is not effective. The mere incantation without
more of a duty to peacefully settle does not guarantee that result.
The prolonged and violent history of the Anglo-Icelandic and U.S.Peru fishery disputes is sufficient proof of that point. Moreover,
despite recent moves by the ICJ to improve its efficiency, 90 the
limitation of its jurisdiction to nation-states only, renders it unable to fulfill the needs of the regime. 91
On the other hand, acceptance of a more compulsory structure is
arguably unlikely. It is no accident that the Soviet Union advocates utilization of Article 33; she did not approve the Fisheries Convention principally because all disputes arising thereunder are subject to the mandatory determination by an ad hoc arbital board. 92
However, as a practical matter, Russia has maintained a record of
cooperation with and de facto acceptance of the machinery of the
various conventions and treaties to which it is a party. 93 This, coupled with the Soviet's obvious acceptance of international commercial arbitration, leads to the not unreasonable expectation that
94
Russia would find an alternative, such as arbitration, acceptable.
86. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T., T.I.A.S. No. 5969,
559 U.N.T.S. 285.
87. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Sea, supra note 86, arts. 9-12.
88. 450 U.N.T.S. 169.
89. The proposals of Tanzania and The Commission to Study merely
state that upon failure of prior attempts to settle, referral "shall" be
made to the ICJ.
90. See Note by the Registry Indicating the Rules of Court Amended
on May 10, 1972 in 11 INx'L LEGAL MAT RiAxs 899 (1972).
91. See discussion in text following note 73, supra.
92. W. BuTLER, THE SoV= UmON Am THE LAW or TH SEA 193 (1971).
93. Id. at 193-94.
94. Id. at 194.
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It is possible that other nations may be similarly persuaded.
In short, utilization of existing U.N. procedures is the de minimis
approach. It provides the least in terms of effective compulsory
settlement but the greatest acceptability. By leaving the thorny political questions (e.g. seaward limit of national sovereignty) to
other organs of the regime and by emphasizing familiar settlement
devices (e.g. arbitration), it appears possible to effectuate a more
desirable alternative for dispute settlement.
B. Arbitration
Settlement by arbitration is the means favored by France, 95 Poland, 96 Japan,9 7 and Senator Claiborne Pell.98 The Japanese propose
a three member ad hoc board wherein parties plaintiff and defendant each choose a member from a standing panel. The two members so designated then choose the third. 99 The tribunal is empowered to render a final and binding decision on matters within the
scope of the regime unless the parties otherwise agree to submit
the case to the ICJ.100
Although primarily relying on Article 33, of the U.N. Charter,
Poland envisages a special Arbital Tribunal for certain kinds of disputes. 10 1 The Pell proposal is not technically arbitration at all;
it is a standing review panel of three members appointed by the
ICJ with appeal to the International Court.10 2 Finally, the French
95. France: Draft Proposal, Part II, Sec. B, 115, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/27;
supra note 10, at 110, 112.

ODA,

96. Poland:

Working Paper Concerning an International Organization

To Be Established to Deal with the Problems of the Exploration and Exploitation of the Mineral Resources of the International Area of the SeaBed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, the Limits of Which
Are To Be Determined, Part II, Sec. 7, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/44 [hereinafter
cited as Poland Working Paper]; ODA, supra note 10, at 130, 135.
97. Japan: Outline of a Convention on the International Sea-Bed Re-

gime and Machinery, §§ 37-38, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/63 [hereinafter cited
as Japan Outline]; ODA, supra note 10, at 210, 217.

98. Senator Claiborne Pell, Declaration of Legal Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Exploitation of Ocean Space,
in S. Res. 33, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. Part III, §§ 10-16 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Pell Declaration]; ODA, supra note 10, at 277.
99. Japan Outline, supra note 97, at § 37; ODA, supra note 10, at 217.
100. Japan Outline, supra note 97, at § 38; ODA, supra note 10, at 217.
101. Poland Working Paper, supra note 96, at Part II § 7; ODA, supra
note 10, at 135.
102. Pell Declaration, supra note 98, Part III, §§ 10-16; ODA, supra note
10, at 277.

call for arbitration in limited circumstances, and then only if prior
negotiations completely fail. 0 3
The Japanese proposal most nearly satisfies the criteria set out in
Part II. In giving the parties the power to name the arbitrators,
the proposal strides toward providing due regard for the various
legal systems, hence acceptability. Likewise, subject matter jurisdiction co-extensive with the scope of the regime, together with the
absence of restrictions on personal jurisdiction, ensures the tribunal's power to decide all justiciable controversies arising in the
regime.
One ancillary question which the delegates to the Caracas Conference should consider is the extent to which the decisions of the
judicial organ should reflect a desire for uniformity and predictability in the law. The more desirable this objective becomes, the
less attractive is the Japanese model. By not promulgating any
guidelines regarding the number and manner of electing members
to the panel, it is conceivable that successive tribunals could render
contradictory decisions. Because of the potential for instability
inherent in a system of completely ad hoc arbitration, it is suggested that some institutional means of control exist over the selection of the panel from which the arbitrators are chosen.
C.

Creationof a Court of Maritime Jurisdiction

The enactment of an entirely new judicial body, competent in
regime matters, is suggested by Malta, 0 4 Canada, 0 5 the U.S.A., 0 0
The World Peace Through Law Center, 0 7 Mrs. Elizabeth Mann
Borgese,108 and Mr. Christopher Pinto. 0 9 Under the U.S. proposal,
103. France: Draft Proposal, supra note 95, Part II, Sec. B, ff 5; ODA,
supra note 10, at 112.
104. Malta: Draft Ocean Space Treaty, arts. 152-54, 159-63, U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 138/53 [hereinafter cited as Malta Draft Treaty]; ODA, supra note
10, at 149, 182-84.
105. Canada: International Sea-Bed Regime and Machinery Working
Paper, § 15, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/59; ODA, supra note 10, at 195, 204-05.
106. The United States of America: Draft United Nations Convention
on the International Seabed Area, arts. 46-6G, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/25, 9
INT'L LEGAL MIATERrALs 1046, 1060-63 [hereinafter cited as U.S. Draft Convention]; ODA, supra note 10, at 73, 83-86.
107. World Peace Through Law Center: Treaty Governing the Exploration and Exploitation of the Ocean Bed, art. XIV (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Danzig Draft Treaty]; ODA, supra note 10, at 244, 250.
108. Mrs. Elizabeth Mann Borgese: The Ocean Regime-Draft Statute,
art. XIV (Dec. 1970); ODA, supra note 10, at 280, 294-96.
109. Mr. Christopher W. Pinto: Preliminary Draft and Outline of a Convention on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof Beyond National Jurisdiction (1972), ch. VIII [hereinafter cited as Pinto
Preliminary Draft]; ODA, supra note 10, at 305, 325-26.
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the court would have jurisdiction to decide all disputes concerning
interpretation and application of the Convention,1 10 the legality of
or compliance with measures taken by regime agencies,"" and "any
dispute connected with the subject matter of this convention"
submitted pursuant to a license or contract." 2 It may declare actions of the regime null and void, impose fines, and award damages." 3 Members of the Tribunal are to be elected for nine
year terms and with regard to the world's principal legal systems." 4 By carefully enunciating the court's powers of review
and decision, the U.S. has proposed a tribunal of delegated authority. While such circumscription may placate those who fear an
all-powerful court, the tribunal may later find itself embroiled in
jurisdictional disputes. Furthermore, by deferring enforcement to
the Council," 5 the U.S. plan in effect provides a veto over the
judgments of the tribunal. This may be well received as a
further check on the power of the court; or it may be viewed as a
serious impediment to the tribunal's ability to effect an end to conflicts.
The competence of the Maltese proposed court is limited to parties other than states'" and then only where prior attempts at
settlement have failed. 1 7 Again, such restriction may gain initial
acceptance for the court, but may prove problematic in attempting to resolve disputes between states.
With minor differences, the Pinto and Danzig drafts provide for
general jurisdiction co-extensive with the parameters of the regime. Pinto would have the parties first seek self-resolution. If
110. U.S. Draft Convention, supra note 106, at art. 46, 9 INT'L LEGAL

MATERIALS 1060; ODA, supra note 10, at 83.

111. U.S. Draft Convention, supra note 106, at arts. 51, 54, 9 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1061-62; ODA, supra note 10, at 84-85.
112. U.S. Draft Convention, supra note 106, at art. 57, 9 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1062; ODA, supranote 10, at 86.

113. U.S. Draft Convention, supra note 106, at arts. 52, 54, 55, 9 INT'L

LEGAL MATERIALS 1061-62; ODA, supranote 10 at 84-85.

114. U.S. Draft Convention, supra note 106, at arts. 47-48, 9 IN'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1060-61; ODA, supra note 10, at 84.
115. U.S. Draft Convention, supra note 106, at art. 58, 9 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1062; ODA, supra note 10, at 86.
116. Malta Draft Treaty, supra note 104, at art. 161; ODA, supra note
10, at 184.
117. Malta Draft Treaty, supra note 104, at ch. XXIV; ODA, supra note
10, at 182-83.

the dispute remains unresolved after two months, any party may
invoke the court's jurisdiction, unless all the disputants agree to
arbitration. 118 Danzig has no similar provision. Both drafts provide, in different language, that full faith and credit be given to
the judgment in the courts of the member states. 119 On selection of
the judges, however, there is wide divergence. Pinto calls for election by the regime Assembly 20 while Danzig prefers designation
by the U.N. General Assembly.12 ' In the interest of acceptability,
and considering that it is probable that not all nations will initially subscribe to the regime, the judges should not be elected by a
means over which the regime has no control.
V.

RFCOMMENDATION

12 2

The delegates to the Caracas Conference will have to reconcile
acceptability with viability. In practical terms, the former means
adequate representation of the world's legal cultures, clarification
of the law to be applied, and possibly, some degree of direct
control over the selection of judges by the disputants. Viability
is simply the ability to actually compel peaceful settlement of disputes. This necessitates the competence to issue a binding and
enforceable decision on the parties to any dispute arising under the
regime. Finally, parties should not be discouraged from using
the agreed upon means due to high cost or unreasonable delay.
Those who advocate utilization of existing U.N. procedures quite
rightly point out that the regime should not be inflexible. Accordingly, the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter should be
retained as a preliminary step, subject to compulsory determination
by a third party if settlement is not reached in a reasonable time.
In choosing whether that third party should be in the form of an
arbitration board or a court, the major concern is the extent to
which the tribunal should provide for predictability by creating a
uniform body of law. This must then be weighed against the par118. Pinto Preliminary Draft, supra note 109, at art. 75 § 2; ODA, supra
note 10, at 325.
119. Pinto Preliminary Draft, supra note 109, at art. 77; ODA, supra note
10, at 326. Danzig Draft Treaty, supra note 107, at art. XIV(B) (ii); ODA,
supra note 10, at 250.
120. Pinto Preliminary Draft, supra note 109, at art. 42; ODA, supra note
10, at 317-18.
121. Danzig Draft Treaty, supra note 107, at art. XIV(B); ODA, supra
note 10, at 250.
122. At this point, the reader's attention is called to the Appendix which
follows this article. Most of the provisions contained therein are self-explanatory in light of the criteria evolved in part II of this comment. Accordingly, this Recommendation shall discuss only those problems which
have not heretofore been examined in this paper.
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ties' need for confidence in the fairness of the court (i.e. the twin
problems of adequate representation and selection control).
An arbital tribunal and a court can be created to be very much
alike. Both can be granted identical jurisdiction, ability to issue
judgments and enforcement decrees, and means of taxing costs.
The sole difference, then, is the manner of selecting judges. In
the interest of achieving maximum political acceptability, this commentator would urge the adoption of an arbital tribunal. By limiting the choice of arbitrators to a panel of nine to fifteen persons
selected by the legislative organ in a manner calculated to assure
adequate representation, it is hoped that the interaction among the
members of the panel would promote uniformity of interpretation. 123 Finally, arrangements could be made for the panel (or a
portion thereof) to sit en banc when successive judgments on the
same point are in substantial conflict.
A note on enforcement of judgments is in order. Many of the
draft treaties which provide for enforcement do so through internal
machinery, such as referral to the executive branch or deprivation
of certain privileges. Such measures need to be supplemented. To
guarantee security and predictability of enforcement and to protect
the regime from being undermined by the activities in non-party
12 4
states, a system of full faith and credit should be established.
This contemplates imposing a general duty upon the courts of
member states to give recognition to regime decisions. Likewise,
the regime should negotiate with non-member states for similar
recognition. The effect of these measures would be to place a priority on rights derived from the regime 25 and to provide a means
of substitutive enforcement when one against whom a judgment has
has been rendered is unwilling to comply. 126 It is therefore sug123. Greater uniformity in the interpretation of the law will more
likely result from the efforts of a small group than from determinations
made by persons selected from the world at large.
124. Note, Two Neglected Problems in Drafting Regimes for Deep Ocean
Resources, 64 Am. J. INTI'L L. 905, 914 (1970).

125. Id. at 916.
126. Reisman, The Enforcement of International Judgments, 63 Am. J.

L. 1, 6-8 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Reisman]. Substitutive enforcement is the well-known procedure whereby a party who is unable to execute a judgment obtained in state A seeks execution in state B where the
judgment debtor has assets. This, of course, assumes the duty of the courts
of state B to give full faith and credit to the judgment from state A.
DTU'L

gested that signatories to the regime be required to extend full
faith and credit to all tribunal decisions.
To recapitulate, optimum harmonization of the divergent world
interests recommends the creation of an arbital tribunal which
would have compulsory jurisdiction over all persons having disputes arising under the regime. To provide flexibility the disputants should be permitted to first seek a solution according to means
of their own choice. Should such attempt fail, the tribunal should
be chosen from a small panel of persons elected by the regime. To
adequately resolve the conflict, the tribunal should not be limited
in the type of relief which it may grant. Finally, enforcement is to
be assured by obliging the member states to accord full faith and
credit to the judgment.
What is the likelihood that such a structure will ever come into
existence? It is conceded that not all states will initially ratify a
regime treaty.1 27 Likewise, the Soviet Union is well known for its
doctrinal antipathy toward international adjudication. 128 How12 9
ever, we have seen that Russia may not be totally intransigent.
Moreover, arbitration is universally recognized and employed. In
thus selecting an approach which is familiar to the major legal cultures of the world, an arbital tribunal such as the one herein proposed is the one device most likely to be adopted which will effectively settle ocean space disputes.
WM. H.
APpM4DIx13

HAUBERT

II

0

Draft Provisions for the Compulsory Peaceful Settlement of Ocean Space
Disputes
Art. 1. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
§ 1. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over:
(a) All disputes of any nature whatsoever arising out of the
Regime Treaty;
(b) Disputes arising out of activities undertaken in connection
therewith or pursuant thereto;
(c) Disputes connected with the subject matter of the Regime
Treaty and submitted to the Tribunal pursuant to an agreement, contract,
127. Note, supra note 124, at 914.
128. Reisman, supra note 126, at 10 n.30.
129. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
130. In drafting the provisions contained in this Appendix, this commentator has drawn heavily from the Danzig Draft Treaty, supra note 107,
and the Pinto Preliminary Draft, supra note 109. The proposal under Art.
4 § 4 of this Appendix for enforcement is taken almost in toto from the
Draft Protocol for the Enforcement of I.C.J. Judgments, in Reisman, supra
note 126, at 27.
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or license which provides for referral of such disputes to the Tribunal.
§ 2. Any question relating to the Tribunal's jurisdiction in a particular instance shall be determined by the Tribunal.
§ 3. Submission to the Tribunal of any dispute enumerated in § 1
of this Article is compulsory and may be made by application of any party
to the dispute, subject to:
(a) the prior exhaustion of all administrative remedies which
may be provided by the Regime;
(b) the prior inability of the parties to achieve a solution
through negotiation, conciliation, or other means of their own choice.
§ 4. The jurisdiction and process of the Tribunal shall extend to all
Nation-states, private persons (individual or corporate), international organizations, and Regime institutions. If, however, all parties to a dispute
are nationals of one state, the dispute will lie within the jurisdiction of
that state, subject to the power of the Tribunal to issue a binding advisory
opinion regarding the interpretation and application of the Regime Treaty
and/or the validity of any regulation made or action taken pursuant
thereto.
§ 5. The Tribunal shall apply the body of law created by or pursuant
to the Regime Treaty. In addition, the Tribunal shall apply those relevant
principles of international law which are agreed upon in the form of stipulation by the parties. If, in the judgment of the Tribunal, there exists
a substantial unresolved question of international law which is relevant
to the decision of the case, the Tribunal may submit the same to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion, binding upon the parties.
Art. 2. Composition of the Tribunal
§ 1. The Tribunal shall be arbital in form. Disputants shall be
grouped into parties complainant and respondent. Complainant and respondent shall each choose one arbitrator from the panel described in § 2
of this Article. The two arbitrators so designated shall then select a third
member from the panel. Decisions by the arbital board thus selected shall
be by majority vote, all members participating equally.
§ 2. The Tribunal shall consist of a panel of (nine to fifteen) members elected for nine year terms by the legislative organ of the Regime.
All members of the Tribunal shall be persons of recognized competence
in matters within the scope of the Regime, well-disposed toward the goals
and procedures of the Tribunal, and capable of exercising independent
judgment. Election of members to the Tribunal shall be made with due
regard to assuring adequate representation of the principal legal cultures
of the world.
Art. 3.

Procedures and Remedies

§ 1. The Tribunal shall establish its own rules of procedure. These
rules shall de-emphasize form and shall be designed to bring about speedy
resolution of issues. These rules of procedures, once established, shall be
applicable to every case brought before the Tribunal.
§ 2. Parties shall not be restricted in seeking any form of relief which

will adequately resolve the dispute. Nor shall the Tribunal be restricted
in fashioning any remedy, provisional or ultimate, to a particular case.
§ 3. In the interest of economy, any arbital board convened under
Article 2 § 1 may sit at a location agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 4.

Judgment and Enforcement

§ 1. All decisions and opinions of the Tribunal are final, binding upon
the parties, and without appeal. The decision of each arbital board convened under Article 2 § 1 is deemed to be the decision of the Tribunal.
If, within a reasonable time, not to exceed one year, any party discovers
material information, the discovery of which could not have been made
earlier by the exercise of due diligence, the Tribunal, upon application,
may re-open the case for further proceedings.
§ 2. When, upon application, and in the opinion of a majority of the
Tribunal, successive arbital boards have rendered substantially conflicting
decisions, the following procedure is to be employed. The applying party
shall choose three members from the panel, and the applying party's opposition in the prior decision shall choose three members from the panel.
The six so designated shall select three more members from the panel,
with due regard for assuring adequate representation of the world's principal legal cultures. The nine man board so selected shall then resolve
the conflicting decisions.
§ 3. All decisions and judgments of the Tribunal are self-executing,
In the event that a party fails to comply with a decision, the Tribunal,
upon application, shall decide upon measures to give effect to the decision
and shall be competent to issue any and all writs necessary to effectuate
the decision.
§ 4. (a) The enforcement of a Tribunal judgment is the obligation
of all states party to the Regime.
(b) A judgment of the Tribunal creates rights and duties, automatically enforceable in municipal law.
(c) A judgment of the Tribunal is final and binding and enforceable in the territories of states party to the Regime as though it were
the decision of the highest court of that state.
(d) No claim of sovereign immunity can avail against the execution, in any forum, of a judgment of the Tribunal.

